Military Education Coordination Council Working Group

2007 Special Areas of Emphasis Assessment

LTC Chris Lusk
Joint Staff J-7
JPME Planner & Program Manager

Agenda

- SAE Definition/Process
- 2006 approved and 2007 nominated SAE Laydown
- JFEC 2007 SAE nominations

SAE Definition and Pr

SAE's highlight the concerns of OSD, the Services, combatant commands, Defense Agencies and the Joint Staff regarding cov of specific joint subject matter in the PME colleges. They help the currency and relevance of the colleges' JPME curricula and an independent view of what those curricula should address.

Ten SAEs are formulated annually through the JS J7 and approv the DJS.

Process: 1) Submit SAE nominations with justification for rev
2) JFEC review; forward initial assessment to Fall MEC Working Grp
3) MECC Working Group review; forward to MECC
4) MECC review; forward for DJS approval.
5) Approved SAE list is distributed to the joint and college and schools annually during January

JFEC 2007 SAE Assess

2006 APPROVED SAEs	NOMINATED SAEs FOR 2007
1 COUNTERING IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (JOINT STAFF/ J5)	5 JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL (JC2) (JFCOM) (Revise to reflect larger acquisition process changes, not just JC2---JFCOM)
~~2 OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT (ONA) (JFCOM))~~	2 INFORMATION ASSURANCE (JS J6) (Recommend revised language in OPMEP Learning Area 5 to emphasize IA--- J-6/ OSD NII))
~~3 EFFECTS-BASED PLANNING/EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS (EBP/EBO) (JFCOM)~~	~~3 THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY (JFCOM)~~ (Training issue)
	6 AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO JOINT OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (ONA) (JFCOM)
~~4 HOMELAND SECURITY (USNORTHCOM)~~ (Incorporated into curricula. Review OPMEP JLA/JLO's for inclusion in OPMEP---J-7)	7 IRREGULAR WARFARE (JS J3) (Rework description, include discussion of relationship to SSTR---J3/J7)
2 MILITARY SUPPORT TO SECURITY, STABILITY, TRANSITION AND RECONSTRUCTION (MULTIPLE) Add "Operations" to title	~~6 LEVERAGING GOVERNMENT EXPERTISE- THE BIRTH OF JOINT FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDS AT USSTRATCOM (USSTRATCOM)~~ (Info brief)
3 GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT (GFM) (JOINT STAFF J3)	
4 JOINT THEATER LOGISTICS/ DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OWNER Delete "Theater"- broaden perspective to entire supply	

Combine

Revise

Approved 2006 SAE's

Recommendation

JFEC WG 2007 SAE nominations

UNCLASS

1	COUNTERING IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (JOINT STAFF/ J5)
2	MILITARY SUPPORT TO SECURITY, STABILITY, TRANSITION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS (SSTRO) (MULTIPLE)
3	GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT (GFM) (JOINT STAFF J3)
4	JOINT LOGISTICS/ DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OWNER (MULTIPLE)
5	JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL (JC2) (JFCOM)
6	AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO JOINT OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONALASSESSMENT (ONA) (JFCOM)
7	IRREGULAR WARFARE (JS J3)

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SAE #1 Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff/ J-5
Description:

The concept of Countering Ideological Support to Terrorism (CIST) is integral to the USG and military strategy for the War on Terrorism (see NMSP-WOT). CIST attacks extremist ideology, the enemy's strategic center of gravity. All military members should have an understanding of the principle framework of the WOT strategy, including CIST. JPME curricula should challenge students to investigate the five elements of DOD's role in CIST (security, information operations, humanitarian support, military to military contacts and conduct of operations) and provide students with an awareness of the culture, customs, language and philosophy of the enemy. This will allow future leaders to more effectively counter the extremist ideology driving terrorists and providing cover for them to operate within their society.

SAE #1 Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism (Cont)

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff/ J-5
Description (Cont.):

Security. The U.S. Armed Forces and indigenous forces provide security as a critical condition for countering enemy ideologies. A secure environment allows moderates to express themselves without fear of intimidation. Security is also an important condition for the success of many of the counter ideology efforts of other government agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.

Humanitarian Assistance. The considerable capabilities or the U.S. Armed Forces to alleviate suffering in times of hardship provide opportunities to influence the way people perceive their situation and their environment. These efforts are often key to demonstrating benevolence and goodwill abroad, reinforcing support for local governments and mitigating problems that extremists exploit to gain support for their cause.

SAE #1 Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism (Cont)

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff/ J-5
Military Contributions to CIST (cont.):

Military-to-Military contacts. The military's extensive footprint and access to foreign military leaders influence the way they think about the GWOT and the actions they take to counter extremists and promote moderates. The contacts include: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Offices of Military Cooperation and other train-and-equip efforts, foreign participation in Regional Centers, combined training activities and exercises, and senior military contacts.

Conduct of Operations. The way we conduct operation—choosing whether, when, where, and how—can affect ideological support for terrorism. Knowledge of indigenous population's cultural and religious sensitivities and understanding of how the enemy uses the U.S. military's actions against us should inform the way the U.S. military operates. Where effects can be achieved by means

SAE #1 Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism (Cont)

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff/ J-5
Military Contributions to CIST (cont.):

other than direct U.S. military actions, the U.S. Government may seek to do so. Where U.S. military involvement is necessary, military planners should build efforts into the operation to reduce potential negative effects. At the same time, we must, by our military actions, convey the sense that our power cannot be defeated and that, under the right circumstances, we are willing to use it. This will require careful balancing. The conduct of military operations should avoid undercutting the credibility and legitimacy of moderate authorities opposed to the extremists, while defeating extremists' ability to spread their ideology.

Military Information Operations. Amplifying the voices of moderates and countering the extremists can be supported by DoD. These operations are coordinated with other departments and agencies, principally the State Department, as a component of DoD's contribution to public diplomacy and

SAE #2 Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff J-5
Description:

SSTR is defined as Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. Initial guidance has been codified in DoD Directive 3000.05 (approved 28 Nov 2005), "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations." This document establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. Current focus is on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop, while future guidance will address the security, transition, and reconstruction operations components of SSTR operations and DoD's role in each. Executing the National Security Strategy involves engaging crises with a variety of responses including stability operations.

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SAE #3 Global Force Management

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff/ J-3
Description:

GFM aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the Defense Strategy and joint force availability requirements. It provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of U.S. military forces and provides senior decision makers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in force/capability assignment, apportionment, and allocation. GFM accounts for forces and capabilities committed to on-going operations and constantly changing unit availability, identifies the most appropriate and responsive force that best meets combatant command requirements, identifies risk associated with those sourcing recommendations, and provides predictability for rotational force requirements. JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of GFM goals, the roles and responsibilities of the CJCS, Joint Force Provider (USJFCOM) and Global Force Management Board and how the GFM

SAE #4 Joint Logistics/ Distribution Process Owner

Submitting Agency: Multiple
Description:

JPME curricula should emphasis a comprehensive joint concept of support to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) through logistics initiatives: Joint Logistics (including the capability to exercise Directive Authority for Logistics - DAFL) and the Distribution Process Owner. It is important for leaders to comprehend the challenges associated with conducting logistics in a joint environment, and the means available for the JFC to plan, implement, and execute joint logistics. Inherently, students must understand the basic concepts and importance of end-to-end planning and the synchronization of transportation, supply distribution, and supply chain management to support the JFC. A close examination of how the DOD distribution process and supply chain initiatives support the warfighter should be included in JPME.

SAE #5 Joint Command and Control (JC2)

Submitting Agency: USJFCOM
Description:

JC2 is both a program leading to the follow-on system replacing the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and a concept of how to create truly joint command and control systems. The concept and goal is an integral part of the recently signed Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). A QDR C2 Execution Road Map has been drafted and is in final stages of approval. The Road Map charts a path through interim goals and major milestones along the way to JC2 including (but not limited to):

- Training and certifying Service 2/3-star JTF HQs to use SJFHQ organization and procedures

-"Turn-Key" C2 product use

- JBMC2 and Net-Centric Operations

- use of Reach-back to leverage National Centers of Excellence

- establishing uniform Data Standards and Architectures

- fielded capabilities and systems on the horizon

- the plan for closing the gap with Coalition and Multi-national C2

The Joint Educators should be aware of JC2 efforts and impart them

SAE #6 An Effects-Based Approach to Join

Submitting Agency: USJFCOM
Description:

With the publication of the subject JWFC Handbook and the pending publication of JPs 3-0 and 5-0, the effects-based construct is sufficiently mature to be presented substantively—with significant detail--to the students in joint professional military education (JPME). Students should understand its current level of maturation and pervasiveness and more specifically, its implications on the joint operation planning process, the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace processes/products, and the potential involvement of the interagency. In short, the effects-based approach has the potential to offer the national political and military leadership a range of options,
not afforded by traditional military planning, execution and assessment.

SAE #6 Operational Net Assessm

Submitting Agency: USJFCOM
Description:

Operational Net Assessment (ONA) is an integrated process that enhances planning and execution. It is plans and operations centric and includes information and intelligence inputs. ONA integrates people, processes and tools using multiple information sources and collaboration to build and maintain a shared, common, relevant understanding of the operational environment. JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of: 1) how ONA development is a continuous process that synthesizes and integrates information from across commands, the interagency, coalition communities, and other communities of interest into actionable knowledge;
2) how it incorporates a comprehensive and integrated system-of-systems understanding of the operational environment; 3) that the principal product of the ONA is a pre-analyzed range or menu of options in the form of effect-node-action-resource linkages that reside in an automated knowledge base; and
4) that from these options, planners can select specific linkages to develop courses of action in order to help the commander focus capabilities to produce decisive effects within available timelines. JPME should provide the education needed by joint officers to understand the

SAE #7 Irregular Warfare

Submitting Agency: Joint Staff J-3

Description:

The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap defines Irregular Warfare (IW) as "...a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches, in order to erode an adversary's power influence, and will." What differentiates IW from other forms of warfare is its emphasis on the use of irregular forces, and other indirect, non-conventional methods, to subvert, attrite, or exhaust an enemy rather than to defeat him through direct, conventional military confrontation. Common characteristics of irregular warfare include protraction, intertwining military and non-military methods, participation by violent individuals and groups that do not belong to the regular armed forces or police of any state and a struggle for control or influence over, and the support of the host population. Tactical and operational competence in conventional warfighting does not necessarily guarantee tactical, operational, or strategic success in operations and activities associated with IW. IW extends beyond the military domain and incorporates political, psychological, informational and economic methods, which are enabled and supported by the actions of military and other security forces. JPME curricula should focus on the joint, multinational and interagency nature of IW and highlight the both the military and political complexities within an IW environment as well as the relationship between IW

Back-up

SAE #2 Information Ass

Submitting Agency: JS J6
Description:

As the world becomes more and more technology-oriented, the Information Assurance (IA) mission becomes increasingly challenging. This mission involves protecting all classified and sensitive information that is stored or sent through U.S. government equipment. IA professionals go to great lengths to ensure government systems remain impenetrable. This support spans from the highest levels of U.S. government to the individual warfighter in the field.
DoD's current IA mission is to 1) assure the Department's information, information systems, and information infrastructure and 2) support the Department's transformation to network- and data-centric operations and warfare. The DoD IA Strategic Plan has five Goals: Protect Information, Defend Systems and Networks, Provide Integrated IA Situational Awareness, Transform and Enable IA Capabilities, and Create an IA-Empowered Workforce.
DoDD 8500.1, DoDI 8500.2, DoDD 8570.1, and DoD 8570.1-M all require IA to be included in professional military education. It is critical for operational leaders and managers to understand the link between IA and mission accomplishment, the potential consequences of failing to protect information systems, and their role in the process. The